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Abstract 
 
Recent research has shown that telephone conversations disrupt driving ability. We 
asked whether this effect could be attributed to a visual attention impairment. In 
Experiment 1, participants conversed on a telephone or listened to a narrative while 
engaged in multiple object tracking (MOT), a task requiring sustained visual 
attention. We found that MOT was disrupted in the telephone conversation condition, 
relative to single-task MOT performance, while listening to a narrative had no effect. 
In Experiment 2, we asked which component of conversation might be interfering 
with MOT performance. We replicated the conversation and single-task conditions of 
Experiment 1. We added two conditions in which participants heard a sequence of 
words over the telephone. In the shadowing condition, participants simply repeated 
each word in the sequence. In the generation condition, participants were asked to 
generate a new word based on each word in the sequence. Word generation interfered 
with MOT performance, while shadowing did not. The data indicate that telephone 
conversation disrupts attention at a central stage, the act of generating verbal stimuli, 
rather than at a peripheral stage such as listening or speaking.  
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Introduction 
How does distraction affect cognitive performance? In every day life we are 
repeatedly performing multiple tasks simultaneously. We often walk down a street 
talking to a friend, search for our keys while listening to the radio and in some 
instances drive cars while talking on a mobile telephone.  
 
These phenomena have been the subject of recent scrutiny in the laboratory. Dual task 
deficits (i.e. performance costs when participants perform two tasks together 
compared to when they perform the two tasks separately) are well-known in the 
literature (e.g. Allen, McGeorge, Pearson, & Milne, 2006; Allport, Antonis, & 
Reynolds, 1972; Fougnie & Marois, 2006; Pashler & O'Brien, 1993). A prominent 
and socially relevant set of studies has extended this paradigm to the study of a 
popular voluntary dual-task situation, driving while talking on a mobile phone (Briem 
& Hedman, 1995, Strayer, Drews, & Crouch, 2006; Strayer & Drews, 2007; Strayer 
& Johnston, 2001). For example, Strayer et al. (2006) compared the performance of 
drivers who were drunk to those who were talking on a phone. Although the pattern of 
behaviour for each group was different (i.e. drunk drivers exhibited more aggressive 
behaviour by driving closer to vehicles in front and braking harder, whereas those 
conversing on a cell phone showed delayed braking responses) both groups showed 
severe impairments in driving performance. While it may come as no surprise that 
alcohol impairs driving performance, the worrying finding was that participants who 
talked on a mobile phone were also involved in more accidents than when they were 
not talking on the phone. 
 
 
 
R373B, page 4 
What underlies these effects of distraction? The central concept invoked is selective 
attention, our ability to focus limited processing resources on some stimuli while 
ignoring others. Why does talking on a mobile phone disrupt a person’s driving 
ability? Strayer and Johnston (2001) suggest that telephone conversations reduce the 
amount of attention which can be devoted to the driving task, thus impairing 
performance. This is inferred from the fact that peripheral factors, such as motor 
interference from holding the phone, can be ruled out. Drivers were equally impaired 
regardless of whether they were using a hands-free phone or a hand-held device 
(Strayer et al., 2006; Strayer & Johnston, 2001). Furthermore, Strayer & Drews 
(2007) investigated participants’ memory for objects that they had fixated while 
performing a simulated driving task in two conditions: one when they were talking on 
a mobile phone and one when they were not.  In a surprise memory test after the 
experiment it was found that talking on the phone reduced recognition performance 
by 50%, relative to the driving alone condition. Furthermore, recall for items that 
participants had directly fixated was also impaired.  
 
From these data, Strayer and Drews (2007) argued that phone conversation leads to 
inattentional blindness (Mack & Rock, 1998). Additional support for this hypothesis 
came from a separate experiment in which they measured event-related potentials 
(ERPs) elicited during driving either while talking on a phone or not. They found that 
the amplitude of the P300 component was smaller in the conversation condition than 
in the control condition. Since the P300 is assumed to reflect the allocation of 
attention to a task (Sirevaag et al., 1989) this result suggests that telephone 
conversation disrupted attention during driving. 
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However, while attentional impairments are one route to disrupted memory, we 
cannot necessarily infer attentional impairment from reduced memory performance. 
For example, it could also be argued that the act of talking on a mobile phone 
interfered with updating working memory for later recall rather than attention per se; 
P300 amplitude is also thought to reflect updating of working memory (e.g. Donchin 
& Coles, 1988). Since there have been no direct tests of the effect of telephone 
conversation on visual attention, it is still unclear whether the deficit observed in 
driving when talking on a phone reflects a disruption of attention or something else 
(such as updating memory).  
 
Our goal was to directly test whether telephone conversation disrupts attention. We 
investigated this using the multiple object tracking (MOT) paradigm (Pylyshyn & 
Storm, 1988). In MOT, participants are shown an array of identical objects, a subset 
of which are designated as targets. The task is to track the targets while all of the 
items move independently for an extended period of time, which can be several 
seconds or several minutes (Wolfe, Place, & Horowitz, 2007). The standard result is 
that participants can track multiple targets, with a capacity around 3-5 items 
(Cavanagh & Alvarez, 2005). For our purposes, the advantage of the MOT procedure 
is that it taps into both selective and sustained aspects of attention, without a complex 
motor or task switching component. In essence, MOT is a good measure of how well 
participants can sustain visual attention over time (e.g. Horowitz et al., 2007). In order 
to successfully complete the tracking task participants have to continually attend to all 
targets. Without this sustained attention participants are unable to physically 
distinguish targets from distractors. 
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As we noted above, it is now well established that telephone conversation impairs 
driving, and it is intuitively obvious that driving requires attention. However, the act 
of driving comprises several tasks that participants have to complete concurrently in 
order to successfully navigate a vehicle without accidents. For example, when driving, 
as well as having to be visually aware of their environment (the attentional factor) 
people have to concurrently perform other tasks such as manually respond to the 
curvature of the road (by adjusting the steering wheel), update information from side 
and rear-view mirrors, as well as control the speed of the car using the break and 
accelerator pedal. Telephone conversation might hurt driving by interfering with any 
of these sub-tasks individually, or perhaps the ability to switch attention among them. 
If phone conversation reduces MOT performance, then we can confidently claim that 
telephone conversations impair visual attention. However, if the MOT paradigm is 
immune to this interference, then the problem may be more of a purely central 
executive nature. 
 
In Experiment 1, we measured the dual-task deficit in MOT performance while 
participants engaged in a telephone conversation (Experiment 1a), compared to the 
dual-task deficit induced by listening to a narrative (Experiment 1b). We found that 
telephone conversations did interfere with MOT, whereas the control listening task 
did not. 
 
The narrative condition of Experiment 1 demonstrated that listening did not impair 
tracking. In Experiment 2, we asked whether it was the motor act of producing speech 
that interfered with MOT, or whether the bottleneck was at the more central stage of 
generating speech to either a specific conversational context or set of instructions. In 
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this experiment we looked at the effect of shadowing speech (repeating back words to 
the experimenter) on MOT performance versus having to generate a new word based 
on a set of word-game rules. We found that shadowing speech did not impair MOT 
performance but having to generate new words did. Thus, the interference of 
conversing during an attentional task is not a low-level motor interference but a more 
global impairment in cognitive processes needed for sensible and meaningful 
conversation. Put together these data have implications for why telephone 
conversations negatively affect driving. 
Method 
Participants 
All participants were recruited from the volunteer panel of the Brigham and Women’s 
Hospital Visual Attention Laboratory. Each participant passed the Ishihara test for 
color blindness and had normal or corrected to normal vision. All participants gave 
informed consent, as approved by the Partners Healthcare Corporation IRB, and were 
compensated $10/hour for their time.  
 
Each experiment (1a, 1b, and 2) involved twelve participants. 
Stimuli and Procedure 
Each experiment consisted of a single-task condition, in which participants performed 
the MOT task without any other demands, and one or more dual-task conditions. 
Multiple Object Tracking 
The MOT procedure was identical for all three experiments. The MOT tasks were 
conducted on a Macintosh computer running MacOS 9.2, controlled by Matlab 5.2.2 
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and the Psychophysics Toolbox, version 2 (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). The stimuli 
were eight dark grey disks subtending 1.5 degrees visual angle at a viewing distance 
of 57 cm. The background was a uniform light grey. 
 
Participants were instructed to track four target disks. At the beginning of each trial, 
the target disks briefly flashed yellow, before returning to their original color, at 
which point all eight disks began to move. Disks were initially assigned a random 
velocity vector and then followed a repulsion algorithm which ensured that disks 
never occluded one another. The algorithm resulted in unpredictable, random 
trajectories. Disk speed averaged 6.7°/s, with a standard deviation of 3.2°/s. After 3.0 
s, one of the eight disks turned red. Participants were asked to respond to whether the 
red disk was a target or not by pressing one of two keys (the ‘a’ key and the quote 
key). Participants were asked to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. 
Dual-tasks 
In Experiment 1a, there was one dual-task condition, the telephone conversation task. 
In this condition, participants engaged in a telephone conversation with an 
experimenter in a separate room while completing the MOT task. The conversations 
were meant to be as naturalistic as possible, so there was no explicit template. Topics 
of conversations included, but were not limited to, hobbies, what people did on their 
weekends or vacations etc. The main stipulation of each conversation, however, was 
that both the participant and the experimenter made approximately equal 
contributions. All conversations were conducted over speakerphone (i.e., hands-free) 
so that any deficit in performance could not be attributed to motor interference. 
Following the experiment, participants were asked if they ever spoke on a cell phone 
while driving. 
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In Experiment 1b, the dual-task condition was the narrative condition. In this 
condition, participants listened to an audio recording of part of the story “Dracula” by 
Bram Stoker while completing the MOT task. The narrative was taken from the 
lesser-known Chapter 1 of the novel so that participants were unlikely to be familiar 
with this part of the story. Participants were told to pay attention to the story since 
they would be asked to answer questions about the prose after they completed the 
condition. The purpose of the questions was to make sure that participants had 
actually paid attention to the passage. The story was presented to the participants over 
a headset while they were performing the MOT task. 
 
In Experiment 2 there were three dual-task conditions: telephone conversation, 
shadowing and generation (c.f. Strayer & Johnston, 2001). The telephone 
conversation condition was the same as in Experiment 1a. In the shadowing condition, 
instead of engaging in conversation, the experimenter slowly recited a list of words 
over the telephone, and participants had to repeat each word (for example, if the 
experimenter said the word ‘green’ the participant would have to repeat back the word 
‘green’). The generation condition was similar to the shadowing condition except that 
instead of repeating the word, participants had to generate a new word starting with 
the last letter of the stimulus word (for example, if the experimenter said the word 
‘green’ the participant would have to generate a new word beginning with the letter 
‘n’). In both the shadowing and generation conditions the presented words came from 
a previously generated list made up of four and five letter words and presented at a 
rate of approximately one word every four seconds. The word-lists were randomly 
shuffled for each participant. In all experiments, conditions were counterbalanced 
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across participants, and each condition consisted of five practice trials followed by 
fifty experimental trials. In Experiment 2 (but not in Experiment 1) all conditions 
were digitally recorded using Audacity 1.2.5 software (audacity.sourceforge.net). 
Data Analysis 
We analyzed reaction time (RT) and accuracy. RTs less than 200 ms or greater than 
4000 ms were removed as outliers. This led to the removal of less than 1% of the data 
for Experiment 1a, no data in Experiment 1b and 1.4% of the data in Experiment 2. 
Accuracy data were transformed into the signal detection sensitivity parameter d'; 0.5 
errors were added to cells with no errors (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004).  Error bars 
on all figures denote within-subject 95% confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 
1994).  
 
In Experiment 1a, there were no differences in RTs or accuracy between participants 
who said that they regularly spoke on a mobile phone when driving (three 
participants) and those that said they did not (nine participants). Thus, the data were 
collapsed across this variable.  
 
In Experiment 1b, eight out of twelve participants answered all the questions about 
the story correctly. The other four participants made only one mistake. We therefore 
assume that all participants were actively listening to and comprehending the story. In 
Experiment 1a, we assume that participants and the experimenter made equal 
contributions to the conversation. In Experiment 2 we were able to verify this 
assumption by analyzing the audio recordings: participants spoke on average for 50% 
of the time while the experimenter spoke for 49% of the time (the remaining time was 
taken up by non-verbal noise, such as laughter). Accuracy in the shadowing and 
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generation tasks was also high (participants showed 92%, SE +/- 2%, and 89%, SE +/- 
2%, correct respectively). Thus it is clear that in all dual-tasks conditions participants 
were performing the concurrent auditory/verbal task to an acceptable standard. 
Results 
Figures 1 and 2 summarize the data from all three experiments in terms of speed-
accuracy plots. RT is shown on the abscissa and d' on the ordinate. Thus, good 
performance is up and to the left, bad performance down and to the right. Figure 1 
(showing data from Experiments 1a and 1b), contrasts the effects of telephone 
conversation and listening. The data clearly fall into two clusters. In the upper left 
(good performance), we find the two single-task conditions and the narrative 
condition. Speed and accuracy in the narrative condition did not statistically differ 
from the corresponding single task baseline (all ts < 1, ps = n.s.). The telephone 
conditions stands out on this figure, situated down and to the right of the other 
conditions. Performance in this condition was slower (t(11)= -2.5, p < 0.05) and 
accuracy was poorer  (t(11) = 2.5, p < 0.05) than in its single task baseline, 
demonstrating a dual-task deficit. The telephone conversation interfered substantially 
with MOT performance in a way that actively listening to an engaging story did not. 
 
Experiment 2 indicates why telephone conversations interfere with tracking. The data, 
shown in Figure 2, are very clearly ordered. In the upper left (good performance), we 
find the single-task and shadowing condition. Moving down and to the right (impaired 
performance) we find the telephone conversation and generation condition. Simply 
repeating a word back in the shadowing condition does not produce any dual task 
interference. Performance here was not statistically different to that of the single task 
condition in either speed (t(11) = -1.5, p = n.s.) or accuracy (t(11) = 1.2, p = n.s.). 
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However, having a conversation or generating a new word did impair MOT 
performance. Participants were slower and less accurate both in the telephone 
conversation (RT: t(11) = - 2.9, p < 0.05; accuracy: t(11) = 6.8, p < 0.01) and 
generation condition (RT: t(11) = - 7.3, p < 0.05; accuracy: t(11) = 6.3, p < 0.01) 
compared to the single task condition. It seems that the bottleneck in dual-task 
interference in these tasks lies in the cognitive realm of generating new words rather 
than in the motor act of producing speech. 
 
MOT accuracy in the telephone conversation condition was identical to that of the 
generation condition (t(11) = 1.2, p = n.s.). However, participants were slower in the 
generation condition than in the telephone conversation condition (t(11) = -4.5, p < 
0.01). There may be two reasons for this. Perhaps generation is more difficult than 
conversation. If so, it will require more resources so that fewer were available for the 
MOT task. Alternatively, participants may simply be more familiar with conversation 
than with the novel generation tasks; well-practiced tasks require fewer resources (e.g. 
Allport et al., 1972; Shaffer, 1975). Nevertheless, the important finding is that both of 
these conditions (even the ‘well-practiced’ conversation condition) were severely 
impaired compared to when participants were performing the MOT task alone. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Figures 1 and 2 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Discussion 
 
 
R373B, page 13 
Our goal was to determine whether telephone conversation could impair performance 
on a sustained visual attention task. The literature clearly indicates that telephone 
conversations impair performance on simulated driving tasks (Strayer et al., 2006). 
However, driving is a complex task, or rather set of tasks, requiring not only visual 
attention but visuo-motor coordination and high-level executive functioning. Previous 
studies have implicated visual attention by showing impaired recognition of 
previously seen objects (Strayer & Drews, 2007), memory (Strayer, Drews, & 
Johnston, 2003; Strayer & Drews, 2007) and change detection (McCarley et al., 
2004). However, our data directly demonstrate that telephone conversation impairs 
performance on a sustained visual attention task (MOT). MOT is an excellent test of 
sustained visual attention, since participants need to continually attend and track the 
relevant targets in order to have any hope of successfully completing the task. As in 
simulated driving studies (McCarley et al., 2004; Strayer & Johnston, 2001), neither 
listening to an engaging narrative nor shadowing imposed costs on MOT 
performance. However, conversation and word generation, which both have an 
additional cognitive component, did impede MOT performance. It is likely that it is 
this cognitive, generative speech component that interferes with driving when 
conversing on a telephone (see also Strayer & Johnston, 2001). 
 
The effects we report in these experiments are important from both practical and 
theoretical standpoints. Consider the data in Figure 1. Telephone conversation slowed 
RTs by 212 ms, relative to the single-task condition. If we assume that this result 
would generalize to driving, talking on a mobile phone would lead a driver going 60 
miles/hour to travel an additional 18.5 feet (more than the length of the average car) 
before braking. The effect of listening to the radio, or a book on tape, would be about 
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1.8 feet (and remember that responses were slightly more accurate in the narrative 
condition). 
 
Theoretically, these data can also be taken as support for cross-modal links between 
visual and auditory attention (Spence & Read, 2003). There is evidence of deep 
linkage between the brain systems that orient visual attention and those which orient 
auditory attention (Ward, McDonald, Golestani, & Wright, 1998). It is known that 
auditory dual-tasks can interfere with encoding and recall for visual stimuli 
(Dell'Acqua & Jolicoeur, 2000; Herdman & Friedman, 1985; Jolicoeur, 1999). 
Evidence for a central, or amodal pool of attentional resources has come from a 
variety of cross-modal paradigms, including discrete visual tasks and both discrete 
and continuous auditory tasks (for a review, see Arnell & Shapiro, 2001). What is 
new here is a demonstration of interference between a continuous auditory task and a 
continuous visual task. 
  
Our interpretation of these data is that MOT draws on both purely visual attention 
resources and amodal or central attention resources. Generating verbal content 
competes for the amodal resources, leading to interference between MOT (or driving, 
presumably) and conversation. It might be misleading to describe telephone 
conversation as an auditory task in this context, since simple listening does not cause 
problems (Experiment 1b); only when participants must cognitively generate speech 
do we observe interference (Experiments 1a and 2).  
 
This finding of interference between auditory-verbal tasks and a visual attention task 
poses a challenge for multiple resource models of dual-task performance (Navon & 
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Gopher, 1979; Wickens, 1984). For example, Wickens’ (1984) Multiple Resource 
Theory hypothesized that will be a larger dual-task cost associated with tasks that 
share common components than those that do not. More specifically, the theory 
predicts that there should be a higher dual-task cost between two tasks that share the 
same modality (i.e. two visual tasks) than two tasks presented in separate modalities 
(e.g. a visual and an auditory task; Wickens et al., 1983). However, we found a large 
dual-task cost even through the tracking and conversation tasks occurred in different 
modalities. Wickens (2002) argued that similar findings from Strayer and Johnston 
(2001) could be accommodated by assuming that some tasks are simply so 
“engaging” that the competing task is dropped altogether (see also Helleberg & 
Wickens, 2002). While such an explanation might be plausible for conversation as a 
secondary task, the fact that we obtained similar findings using a word generation task 
indicates that our data might be more parsimoniously explained via an amodal central 
bottleneck.  
 
Our data clearly indicate that the bottleneck in question lies at a central, cognitive 
stage of processing. Only the more complex, cognitive tasks of word generation 
interfere with MOT, as opposed to the more purely motor task of repeating speech. 
There may also be other bottlenecks that appear at earlier motor stages in these types 
of tasks. Levy, Pashler & Boer (2006) found that, in a driving simulation task, 
participants were slower to break if they had recently responded either vocally or 
manually to a visual or auditory stimulus. The data suggested that both of these 
response types are subject to the psychological refractory period effect, where 
response to a second stimulus is slowed the closer in time it is to a primary task (see 
Pashler & Johnston, 1998 for a review). Although we found our bottleneck in this 
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paper to occur at a slightly later stage than that of Levy et al. (Footnote 1) our data 
concur with their general conclusion that the bottleneck observed in these tasks is 
‘central’ in nature. Regardless of differences in sensory or response modalities and 
processing stages, there is a common mental resource such that, if two such tasks are 
performed in parallel, performance on at least one task will suffer. 
 
Another point to note is that talking on a telephone may have a social element that 
purely listening to an auditory narrative does not have. Participants may feel more 
social pressure to maintain a conversation than they would do to listen to an auditory 
message (Footnote 2). This could make the conversation task more difficult than the 
narrative task in Experiment 1, requiring more cognitive resources and leaving fewer 
to spend on the attentional task. In Experiment 2, all of the tasks involved a social 
interaction between the participant and the experimenter. One might hypothesize that 
conversation imposes unique social pressures that shadowing, even over the 
telephone, does not. In that case, however, it is difficult to explain why word 
generation was even more difficult than conversation. Nevertheless, it is important to 
keep in mind the social aspect of telephone conversation in the real world. Please note 
that our participants might not be as invested in their conversations with the 
experimenter as they are when talking to friends, family, or business associates. Thus 
our laboratory studies may actually underestimate the danger posed by mobile phone 
conversations while driving in the real world.  
 
Telephone conversations probably disrupt driving via multiple pathways. Our data 
clearly implicate attention, but we can also infer a problem at the level of executive 
control. Previous work (Alvarez, Horowitz, Arsenio, DiMase, & Wolfe, 2005) has 
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demonstrated that there is minimal interference between visual search and MOT, a 
finding they attributed to time-sharing between the two demanding visual attention 
tasks. Why does time-sharing fail in our paradigm? As Strayer and Drews (2007) have 
noted, conversation occurs in natural segments (“turns”) which cannot be broken up 
arbitrarily. Thus, the tracker (or driver) cannot shift attention between the two tasks at 
will, or according to the difficulty of the MOT task at the moment (c.f. Grabowecky, 
Iordanescu, & Suzuki, 2007), but is at the mercy of her interlocutor. For this reason, 
conversations with passengers are generally less dangerous than mobile phone 
conversations, since passengers may also be attending to the difficulty of the driving 
task and can modulate their conversation accordingly. 
 
In summation, this paper again points to the dangers of talking on a telephone while 
driving. New to the literature is the fact that telephone conversations impair sustained 
visual attention. When this is put together with the idea of a central bottleneck and the 
extra burden on executive control, it is clear that both drivers and driving regulators 
should take the implications of such actions seriously. 
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Footnotes 
 
1) Presumably due to the different experimental demands.  
 
2) We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
 
R373B, page 24 
Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1: Speed-accuracy plots of Experiment 1. RTs are plotted on the x-axis, d’ on 
the y-axis. Good performance is therefore up and to the left and poor performance is 
down and to the right. All error bars denote 95% within-subject confidence intervals 
(Loftus & Masson, 1994).  
 
Figure 2: Speed-accuracy plot of Experiment 2. RTs are plotted on the x-axis, d’ on 
the y-axis. Good performance is therefore up and to the left and poor performance is  
down and to the right. All error bars denote 95% within-subject confidence intervals 
(Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
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